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Exploiting the algebraic structure of the set of bimatrix games, a divide-and-conquer algo-
rithm for finding Nash equilibria is proposed. The algorithm is fixed-parameter tractable
with the size of the largest irreducible component of a game as parameter. An implemen-
tation of the algorithm is shown to yield a significant performance increase on inputs with
small parameters.
1 Introduction
A bimatrix game is given by two matrices (A,B) of identical dimensions. The first player picks
a row i, the second player independently picks a column j. As a consequence, the first player
receives the payoff Aij , the second player Bij . Both player are allowed to randomize over their
choices, and will strive to maximize their expected payoff. A Nash equilibrium is a pair of
strategies, such that no player can improve her expected payoff by deviating unilaterally.
If the payoff matrices are given by natural numbers, then there always is a Nash equilibrium
using only rational probabilities. The computational task to find a Nash equilibrium of a bima-
trix game is complete for the complexity class PPAD [15, 5, 4]. PPAD is contained in FNP, and
commonly believed to exceed FP. In particular, it is deemed unlikely that a polynomial-time
algorithm for finding Nash equilibria exists.
The next-best algorithmic result to hope for could be a fixed-parameter tractable (fpt) al-
gorithm [6, 9], that is an algorithm running in time f(k)p(n) where n is the size of the game,
p a polynomial and k a parameter. For such an algorithm to be useful, the assumption the pa-
rameter were usually small needs to be sustainable. The existence of fpt algorithms for finding
Nash equilibria with various choices of parameters has been studied in [7, 11, 8].
In the present paper we demonstrate how products and sums of games – and their inverse
operations – can be used to obtain a divide-and-conquer algorithm to find Nash equilibria.
This algorithm is fpt, if the size of the largest component not further dividable is chosen as a
parameter. Products of games were introduced in [17] as a means to classify the Weihrauch-
degree [2, 3, 1, 12] of finding Nash equilibria for real-valued payoff matrices. Sums appear
originally in the PhD thesis [18] of the second author; the algorithm we discuss was implemented
in the Bachelor’s thesis [13] of the first author.
2 Products and Sums of Games
Both products and sums admit an intuitive explanation: The product of two games corresponds
to playing both games at the same time, while the sum involves playing matching pennies to
determine which game to play, with one player being rewarded and the other one punished in
the case of a failure to agree.
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2 Decomposing bimatrix games
2.1 Products
In our definition of products, we let [ , ] : {1, . . . , n} × {1, . . . ,m} → {1, . . . , nm} denote the
usual bijection [i, j] = (i − 1)n + j. The relevant values of n,m will be clear from the context.
We point out that [ , ] is polynomial-time computable and polynomial-time invertible.
Definition 1. Given an n1 × m1 bimatrix game (A1, B1) and an n2 × m2 bimatrix game
(A2, B2), we define the (n1n2) × (m1m2) product game (A1, B1) × (A2, B2) as (A,B) with
A[i1,i2][j1,j2] = A
1
i1j1
+A2i2j2 and B[i1,i2][j1,j2] = B
1
i1j1
+B2i2j2 .
Theorem 2. If (xk, yk) is a Nash equilibrium of (Ak, Bk) for both k ∈ {0, 1}, then (x, y) is a
Nash equilibrium of (A,B), where x[i1i2] = x
1
i1
x2i2 and y[m1m2] = y
1
m1y
2
m2 .
Proof. We will prove that x is a best response to y, if xk is a best response to yk for both k ∈
{0, 1}, the remaining part is analogous. By applying the following equivalence transformation
(n1n2)∑
i=1
(m1m2)∑
j=1
xiAi,jyj
=
n1∑
i1=1
n2∑
i2=1
m1∑
j1=1
m2∑
j2=1
x[i1,i2]A[i1,i2],[j1,j2]y[i1,j2]
=
n1∑
i1=1
n2∑
i2=1
m1∑
j1=1
m2∑
j2=1
x1i1x
2
i2
(A1i1,j1 +A
2
i2,j2
)y1j1y
2
j2
=
[
n1∑
i1=1
m1∑
j1=1
xi1A
1
i1,j1
yj1
(
n2∑
i2=1
xi2
)(
m2∑
j2=1
yj2
)]
+
[
n2∑
i2=1
m2∑
j2=1
xi2A
2
i2,j2
yj2
(
n1∑
i1=1
xi1
)(
m1∑
j1=1
yj1
)]
=
[
n1∑
i1=1
m1∑
j1=1
xi1A
1
i1,j1
yj1
]
+
[
n2∑
i2=1
m2∑
j2=1
xi2A
2
i2,j2
yj2
]
on both sides of the best response condition
n1n2∑
i=1
m1m2∑
j=1
xiAi,jyj ≥
n1n2∑
i=1
m1m2∑
j=1
xˆiAi,jyj
one obtains the following form for the best response condition:[
n1∑
i1=1
m1∑
j1=1
xi1A
1
i1,j1
yj1
]
+
[
n2∑
i2=1
m2∑
j2=1
xi2A
2
i2,j2
yj2
]
≥[
n1∑
i1=1
m1∑
j1=1
xˆi1A
1
i1,j1
yj1
]
+
[
n2∑
i2=1
m2∑
j2=1
xˆi2A
2
i2,j2
yj2
]
As this is just the sum of the best response conditions for the individual games (A1, B2) and
(A2, B2), the claim follows.
Theorem 3. If (x, y) is a Nash equilibrium of (A,B), then (x1, y1) given by x1i =
n2∑
l=1
x[i,l] and
y1j =
m2∑
l=1
y[j,l] is a Nash equilibrium of (A
1, B1).
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Proof. Again the proof uses contraposition. Assume w.l.o.g. that xˆ1 is a better response against
y1 than x1, that is:
n1∑
i=1
m1∑
p=1
xˆ1iA
1
i,jy
1
j >
n1∑
i=1
m1∑
j=1
x1iA
1
i,jy
1
j
Add
n2∑
i=1
m2∑
j=1
x2iA
2
i,jy
2
j on both sides, and apply the reverse of the transformation used in the proof
of Theorem 2. Then one obtains:
n1n2∑
i=1
m1m2∑
j=1
xˆiAi,jyj >
n1n2∑
i=1
m1m2∑
j=1
xˆiAi,jyj
with xˆ defined via xˆ[i1,i2] = xˆ
1
i1
x2i2 . This contradicts the assumption that x would be a best
response against y, so (x, y) cannot be a Nash equilibrium.
2.2 Sums
The sum of games involves another parameter besides the two component games, which just is
a number exceeding the absolute value of all the payoffs.
Definition 4. Given an n1 × m1 bimatrix game (A1, B1) and an n2 × m2 bimatrix game
(A2, B2), we define the (n1 + n2) × (m1 + m2) sum game (A1, B1) + (A2, B2) via the constant
K > maxi,j{|Ai,j |, Bi,j |} as (A,B) with:
Ai,j =

A1ij if i ≤ n1, j ≤ m1
A2(i−n1),(j−m1) if i > n1, j > m1
K otherwise
Bi,j =

B1ij if i ≤ n1, j ≤ m1
B2(i−n1),(j−m1) if i > n1, j > m1
−K otherwise
Lemma 5. Let (x, y) be a Nash equilibrium of (A1, B1) + (A2, B2). Then 0 < (
∑n1
i=1 xi) < 1
and 0 <
(∑m1
j=1 yj
)
< 1.
Proof. Assume (x, y) is a Nash equilibrium. The following circular reasoning demonstrates that
any of the forbidden cases yields a contradiction.
1. If 0 =
∑n1
i=1 xi, then also 0 =
∑m1
j=1 yj .
If yj > 0 for any j ≤ m1, then y′ defined via y′j = 0, y′m1+1 = ym1+1 + yj and y′l = yl for
l 6= j,m1 + 1 is a better response against x than y: The payoff difference between y′ and y
is yj
(∑n2
i2=1
(B2i2,m1+1 +K)xn1+i2
)
, and by choice of K every (B2i2,m1+1 +K) is positive.
2. If 0 =
∑m1
j=1 yj , then
∑n1
i=1 xi = 1.
If xi > 0 for any i > n1, then x
′ defined via x′i = 0, x
′
1 = x1 + xi and x
′
l = xl for
l 6= 1, i is a better response against y than x: The payoff difference between x′ and y is
xi
(∑m2
j2=1
(−A2i−n1,j2 +K)ym1+j2
)
, and by choice of K every (−A2i−n1,j2 +K) is positive.
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3. If
∑n1
i=1 xi = 1, then
∑m1
j=1 yj = 1.
The proof proceeds as in 1. via symmetry.
4. If
∑m1
j=1 yj = 1, then 0 =
∑n1
i=1 xi.
The proof proceeds as in 2. via symmetry.
Theorem 6. If (x, y) is a Nash equilibrium of (A1, B1) + (A2, B2), then a Nash equilibrium
(x1, y1) of (A1, B1) can be obtained as x1i =
xi∑n1
l=1 xl
and y1j =
yi∑m1
l=1 yl
.
Proof. By Lemma 5, (x1, y1) is well-defined, and clearly a strategy profile. W.l.o.g. we assume
that x1 is not a best response against y1, and derive a contradiction. Let x1 be a better response
against y1 than x1. Define x via xi = x
1
i
(∑n1
l=1 xl
)
for i ≤ n1, and xi = xi otherwise. We claim
that x is a better response against y than x. The payoff difference between x and x for the
first player can readily be computed to be
(∑n1
l=1 xl
)∑n1
i1=1
∑m1
j1=1
Ai1,j1(x
1
i1
−x1i1)yi2 . Up to the
positive factor
[(∑n1
l=1 xl
) (∑m1
k=1 yk
)]−1
, this is equal to the payoff difference between x1 and
x1, hence the former is positive iff the latter is.
Theorem 7. Let (xk, yk) be a Nash equilibrium of (Ak, Bk) resulting in payoffs (P k, Qk) for both
k ∈ {1, 2}. Then (x, y) is a Nash equilibrium of (A1, B1) + (A2, B2), where xi = x1i K−Q
2
2K−Q1−Q2
for i ≤ n1, xi = x2i−n1 K−Q
1
2K−Q1−Q2 for i > n1, yj = y
1
j
K−P 2
2K−P 1−P 2 for j ≤ m1, yj = y2j−m1 K−P
1
2K−P 1−P 2
for j > m1.
Proof. In the given situation, assume (x, y) were not a Nash equilibrium. W.l.o.g., let this be
due to x not being a best response to y. This is equivalent to the existence of some i with xi > 0,
but the pure strategy i is not a best response to y. The latter means there is a better response
k to y, i.e.:
Case i ≤ n1, k ≤ n1 (
m1∑
j1=1
A1kj1y
1
j1
K − P 2
2K − P 1 − P 2
)
+
(
m2∑
j2=1
Ky2j2
K − P 1
2K − P 1 − P 2
)
>
(
m1∑
j1=1
A1ij1y
1
j1
K − P 2
2K − P 1 − P 2
)
+
(
m2∑
j2=1
Ky2j2
K − P 1
2K − P 1 − P 2
)
Subtracting
(∑m2
j2=1
Ky2j2
K−P1
2K−P1−P2
)
on both sides, then dividing by K−P
2
2K−P1−P2 shows that
k is a better response against y1 than i in the game (A1, B1). But then x1i = 0 follows,
hence xi = 0 in contradiction to the assumption.
Case i ≤ n1, k > n1 (
m1∑
j1=1
Ky1j1
K − P 2
2K − P 1 − P 2
)
+
(
m2∑
j2=1
A1kj2y
2
j2
K − P 1
2K − P 1 − P 2
)
>
(
m1∑
j1=1
A1ij1y
1
j1
K − P 2
2K − P 1 − P 2
)
+
(
m2∑
j2=1
Ky2j2
K − P 1
2K − P 1 − P 2
)
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As they are sums over stochastic vectors, we find
(∑m1
j1
y1j1
)
=
(∑m2
j2
y2j2
)
= 1. Moreover,
xi 6= 0 implies x1i 6= 0, and this in turn implies
(∑m1
j1=1
A1ij1y
1
j1
)
= P 1. Hence, after
multiplying both sides by (2K − P 1 − P 2) the previous inequality simplifies to:
K(K − P 2) +
(
m2∑
j2=1
A1kj2y
2
j2
)
(K − P 1) > P 1(K − P 2) +K(K − P 1)
This in turn can be simplified to
(∑m2
j2=1
A1kj2y
2
j2
)
> P 2, which contradicts the assumption
P 2 were the optimal payoff achievable by player 1 against y2.
Case i > n1, k ≤ n1 Analogous to Case i ≤ n1, k > n1
Case i > n1, k > n1 Analogous to Case i ≤ n1, k ≤ n1
3 The algorithm
Our basic algorithm proceeds as follows: To solve a game (A,B)
1. test whether (A,B) is the sum of (A1, B1) and (A2, B2) via some constant K. If yes, solve
(A1, B1) and (A2, B2) and combine their Nash equilibria to an equilibrium of (A,B) via
Theorem 7. If no,
2. test whether (A,B) is the product of (A1, B1) and (A2, B2). If yes, solve (A1, B1) and
(A2, B2) and combine their Nash equilibria to an equilibrium of (A,B) via Theorem 2. If
no,
3. find a Nash equilibrium of (A,B) by some other means.
For some n × m game (A,B) let let S(A,B) denote its size, i.e. S(A,B) = nm, and let
λ(A,B) be the size of the largest game for which 3. in our algorithm is called. Let f(k) be the
time needed for the external algorithm called in 3. on a game of size k. Then the runtime of our
algorithm is bounded by O(S3f(λ)), in particular, it is an fpt-algorithm:
Testing whether a game is a sum, and computing the components, if applicable, can be done
in linear time. The sum of the sizes of the components is less than the size of the original game.
Finally, combining Nash equilibria can be done in linear time, too.
Whether a game is a product of factors of a fixed size can also be tested in linear time.
Testing the different possible factors yields quadratic time for this part. This already includes
computing the components, and the product of the sizes of the factors is equal to size of the
original game. Again, combining the Nash equilibria takes linear time.
As a slight modification of our algorithm, one can eliminate (iteratively) strictly dominated
strategies at each stage of the algorithm. We recall that a strategy i of some player is called
strictly dominated by some other strategy j, if against any strategy chosen by the opponent,
i provides its player with a strictly better payoff than j. A strictly dominated strategy can
never be used in a Nash equilibrium. It is easy to verify that a game decomposable as a sum
never has any strictly dominated strategies, but may occur as the result of the elimination of
such strategies. Hence, including an elimination step for each stage increasing the potential for
decomposability. Elimination of strictly dominated strategies commutes with decomposition of
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products, i.e. the reduced from of the product is the product of the reduced forms of the factors.
The algorithm remains fpt if such a step is included. A detailed investigation of complexity
issues regarding removal of dominated strategies can be found in [16].
4 Empirical evaluation
Only a small fraction of the bimatrix games of a given size and bounded integer payoffs will be
decomposable by our techniques, this limiting the applicability of the algorithm in Section 3.
However, to some extent we can expect patterns in the definitions of real-world game situation
to increase the decomposability of the derived bimatrix games. For example, the structure of
Poker-style games implies decomposability, as can be concluded from the considerations in [10].
To obtain a first impression whether using the decomposition algorithm is indeed beneficial,
a collection of 100 random decomposable games was created. Each game has 95-105 strategies
per player, and payoff values range from 0 to 50. The decomposability was ensure by creating
a random tree representing the relevant decomposition structure first, using probabilities of 0.4
each for sum and product decomposition, and of 0.2 for an elimination of strictly dominated
strategies step. The height of the trees was limited to 80, additionally vertices corresponding to
games of size up to 6 were turned into leaves. At the leaves, the payoffs were chosen uniformly
subject to the constraints derived from the structure and the overall constraint of payoff values
being between 0 and 50. Finally, the corresponding bimatrix games were computed.
Both as a benchmark, and in order to compute Nash equilibria of the irreducible component
games, the tool Gambit [14] was used. Gambit offers a variety of algorithm for computing
Nash equilibria of bimatrix games, we used:
1. gambit-enummixed: using extreme point enumeration
2. gambit-gnm: using a global Newton method approach
3. gambit-lcp: using linear complementarity
4. gambit-simpdiv: using simplicial subdivision
Figures 1.-4. show for each of the Gambit algorithms how many of our decomposable
example games could be solved in some given time bound (per game, not total) using only the
Gambit algorithm directly, or exploiting decomposition implemented in C++ first. Despite the
fact that our decomposition algorithm was not optimized, it turned out that using decomposition
almost all games could be solved in under 3 seconds, whereas even gambit-gnm as the fastest
Gambit algorithm on the sample took 30 seconds for a similar feat. Thus, there is clear
indication that on suitable data, exploiting the algebraic structure underlying the decomposition
algorithm yields a significant increase in performance.
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